How did the Kuomintang go from a big victory in 2018 to a big defeat in 2020?

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What is the reason for

? In just 13 months, the Kuomintang won 15 county and mayors in the “Nine-in-One” election at the end of 2018, and the number of votes surpassed the DPP by about 1.2 million votes, to the election in early 2020. A major defeat of 2.6 million votes while allowing the DPP to maintain a single majority in the "Legislative Yuan"? What made the election pendulum swing so fast? The author believes that the following three main factors make the 2020 election a "sustainable" election: including the Kuomintang's ability to expand votes, external factors highlighting "sovereignty" issues, and the people's relatively conservative attitude towards cross-strait relations.

How did the Kuomintang go from a big victory in 2018 to a big defeat in 2020? - Lujuba

First of all, the victory of the Kuomintang in 2018 has become the curse of the 2020 election. The election of county and mayor at the end of the previous year created the new hero of the Kuomintang Han Yu . At that time, the Kuomintang’s strategy was to focus on Tsai Ing-wen’s ineffective governance and set the election to be a "vote of no confidence" against the Tsai Ing-wen government. But is this true?

The author analyzed the post-election poll data of Kaohsiung mayor and found that the main reason voters did not continue to support the DPP’s ruling in Kaohsiung was not because of dissatisfaction with Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, but dissatisfaction with the performance of the local government.

To put it simply, the DPP has been in power in Kaohsiung for 20 years, and voters want to change. Of course, the rapid rise of Hanguo Yu and the special election style of the atypical KMT produced spillover effects and helped other county and mayors win local elections.

While the DPP’s main focus on "protection of sovereignty" in local elections is a strategic mistake in fighting the KMT’s economy. After all, local elections are not about electing regional leaders, and mayors cannot dominate cross-strait policies. People in local elections The most important thing is the local economic development and welfare. The theme of Taiwan-wide elections in local elections is just to make voters feel insensitive.

However, the Kuomintang clearly regards the 2018 election as a prelude to party rotation. In the 2016 election, when the Kuomintang had no one to vote at first, Hong Xiuzhu would "sell bricks to attract jade." By 2019, everyone in the party who is capable will be elected, which is obviously inspired by the 2018 election. But everyone has forgotten that since the 2016 defeat, the KMT has not made any major reforms and changes. The only thing that has changed is that the party assets are gone, and there are no resources for elections. If you look at the poll numbers, from 2016 to 2018, the support of the DPP has dropped a lot, but it does not mean that the support of the KMT has increased significantly.

How did the Kuomintang go from a big victory in 2018 to a big defeat in 2020? - Lujuba

​​Hanguo Yu’s "hero" image in local elections quickly condensed the relatively disadvantaged economically in the past few years (such as the tourism industry and hawkers who lost due to the lack of visitors), and those who were reformed (such as the military, public and educational pensions). Support from public service retirees who felt unfair due to reforms and political “incorrect” (such as emphasizing the traditional values ​​of Chinese culture). These “marginal people” in Taiwan’s economic and political fields in the past few years have found in Han Yu A sense of identity, and then became a steel Korean fan, assisting him to win in the mobilization primary polls and become the 2020 candidate of the Kuomintang. However, due to the high cohesion and exclusivity of the core supporters of Hanguo Yu, Hanguo Yu’s votes It has been unable to expand. Under the circumstances that it can only hold on to the basic market, the overall support of the KMT cannot be improved. In short, the 2018 local elections created a follow-up Korean whirlwind, but the foundation was unstable and there was no unity consensus within the party. Under the circumstances, the “Korean Wave” will not be able to fundamentally reverse the support of the two major political parties. This is not the same as the situation after the 2014 DPP victory in the local elections.

How did the Kuomintang go from a big victory in 2018 to a big defeat in 2020? - Lujuba

Second, many people It is believed that the "One Country, Two Systems Taiwan Program" in early 2019 and the subsequent Hong Kong "anti-send to China" struggle have allowed Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party to find a good entry point for issues. "Hong Kong today, Taiwan tomorrow" has indeed created a shadow in the hearts of voters. Especially for young voters. Various polls before the

election can see that most people are worried about Hong Kong’s situation. This also makes the DPP’s main "protecting Taiwan and Taiwan protection" echoed, while the KMT’s main economic development Issues, especially the past model of relying on closer cross-strait exchanges to drive Taiwan’s economic development, not only failed to attract intermediate voters, but even pushed young voters who value democracy and the value of "sovereignty" farther.

In short, despite the pre-election poll data It shows that most people in Taiwan (including young voters) still believe that economic development is currently the most important issue facing Taiwan, but the importance of the “sovereignty” issue has increased a lot in this election. From the perspective of issue setting, the peopleThe Progressive Party completely dominated the right to speak on issues during the second half of 2019.

How did the Kuomintang go from a big victory in 2018 to a big defeat in 2020? - Lujuba

​​Finally, the biggest difference between Taiwan-wide general elections and local elections is that, compared with local heads of counties and cities, candidates for regional leaders must gain public approval and trust in handling cross-strait relations. According to the polls before the election, a relatively large number of people not only recognized Tsai Ing-wen’s performance in handling cross-strait relations in the past four years, but also remained skeptical about the effectiveness of the "92 Consensus". In other words, despite the current stagnation of cross-strait exchanges and the freezing of official interactions, in the general atmosphere of international containment of China, the public's attitude towards cross-strait relations is cautious and conservative. While the Kuomintang could not get rid of the label of "leaning in the middle", Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait line was conservative, but it was in line with the expectations of the majority of Taiwanese people. This election result also maintained the tone of the 2016 general election and became a "maintenance." The KMT was unable to reverse the election.

(This article originally appeared in Taiwan’s China Times, by Yu Zhenhua, associate researcher and associate professor of the Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taiwan)

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