Russian-Ukrainian War——Semi-annual evaluation
Tang Shiping
Recently, Tang Shiping, an expert from the Center for Complex Decision Analysis of Fudan University, conducted a semi-annual evaluation of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Tang Shiping believes that from the current trend of the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, the Russian army won in Ukraine The probability is definitely less than 50%. The reason for such a situation is not only because of Russia's own surprising performance, but also because of the large-scale military assistance of Western countries to Ukraine. Although Ukraine paid a very heavy price in this war, it did prevent Russia's plan to quickly defeat Ukraine. If Russia is still unable to gain a decisive advantage on the battlefield, then Russia is bound to fall into a slow defeat.
The current basic situation
Like almost all analysts, at the beginning of the war I thought that Russia could win quickly, as short as 1-2 months, as long as 3-4 months. As a result, in the first phase of the war, the Russian army's performance was astonishing, and it appeared ill-prepared in intelligence, logistics, strategy and tactics.
In contrast, although the Ukrainian army is clearly at a disadvantage in both air and firepower, but with flexible tactics, better intelligence coordination, and mastery of the tactics of information warfare, the Ukrainian army not only blocked the Russia's blitz battle , and the Russian army suffered heavy losses (although the price paid by the Ukrainian army is certainly not small).
In fact, starting from 2022-04-08, the Russian army had to adjust its strategic deployment and tactics, completely abandoning the Battle of Kyiv, and basically abandoning the Battle of Kharkiv (until now, I have not seen what some people hoped to happen) "Russian army counterattack on Kharkov"), it is estimated that the goal of occupying Odessa has been abandoned, but instead concentrated forces and weapons, focusing on attacking Donbass area (Donetsk, Luhansk ), trying to achieve the lowest tactical objective. In the second phase starting on 2022-04-08, the Russian army did completely occupy Luhansk and most of Donetsk, but at a considerable cost. The tenacious resistance of the Ukrainian army in the Donbas region also paid a considerable price. In particular, because of the lack of heavy weapons and long-range firepower, the Ukrainian army had to delay the progress of the Russian army as much as possible, so that exchanged space for time , and gradually obtained more heavy weapons from NATO (especially the United States and the United Kingdom). Aid, so that the equipment level of the Ukrainian army has been improved to a certain extent. Of course, because Ukraine does not have a complete defense industry, the Ukrainian army must continue to receive continuous assistance from NATO's heavy weapons in order to continue to persevere.
Aid of more heavy weapons from NATO (especially US, UK) arrives in Ukraine from early June 2022. At the beginning, because the amount was too small and it took time to train into an army, it had little impact on the battlefield before July. However, from mid-July, NATO's heavy weapons began to be deployed to the front line, so it gradually produced a certain effect on the battlefield. In contrast,
, because in the first stage, the Russian army's heavy weapon lost a lot, the Russian army's equipment supply began to be a little "stretched", and even had to use the stock T-62 tank . Therefore, in terms of equipment situation, the combat power of both sides entered a turning point in July: the combat power of the Ukrainian army was rising, while the combat power of the Russian army was declining. However, it is not easy for the Ukrainian army to carry out a large-scale counter-offensive.
Future Situation Assessment
As I said before, at the beginning of the war, most analysts believed that the Russian army could win quickly (everyone was sure that the Ukrainian army could not win quickly). However, once the Russian army could not win quickly, the war entered a state of war of attrition. For Russia, there are only three outcomes: a slow victory; a slow defeat; a draw (and a stalemate in which neither side can achieve overwhelmingAdvantage).
has comprehensively evaluated various aspects. I posted a short comment on Weibo on 2022-05-16:
"After waiting for a few days, based on the comparison of information from multiple channels, it is now basically certain that the Russian army is in . The Kharkov line has been defeated. So far, the Russian army's attack on the most northeastern part of the Ukrainian front (with Kharkov as the fulcrum) has basically been defeated. This will have an important impact on the entire Russian army's front in eastern Ukraine. Of course, it is unrealistic to think that the Ukrainian army can win quickly. However, even from an overall perspective, the Russian army has already shown its defeat."
Since then, the forces of the two sides have declined, and I have no reason to overturn my previous judgment - "Even if From the overall point of view, the Russian army has shown its defeat."
However, to judge the overall situation of the war, we cannot just look at the current battlefield situation, because the war is indeed a "continuation of politics".
From the pure battlefield situation, the probability of the Russian army to win (slow victory) must have been lower than 50%, maybe even less than 1/3 (this is of course not a real calculation, just a judgment). So there are only two outcomes left: a slow defeat (for Russia); a draw (and a stalemate in which neither side can gain an overwhelming advantage).
In my opinion, the overall situation of the war depends mainly on four factors:
1. Whether winter can "save" Russia again. In the history of , winter has decisively and directly "saved" Russia twice. But both times Russia was on the defensive side, while Napoleon and Hitler were on the offensive side. Now, if winter can still "save" Russia, it can only be indirect: the arrival of winter (less than 2 months away) will make the problem of dependence on Russia's oil and gas in Western European countries very difficult , If Western European countries (especially France, Germany, Italy) cannot withstand the pressure and drastically reduce or even stop military aid to Ukraine, it will definitely be beneficial to Russia. However, even so, the situation in Russia cannot be particularly optimistic:
a) According to incomplete statistics, since the beginning of the war, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have provided Ukraine with about $14.5 billion in military assistance (we only discussing military aid). There is no doubt that Ukrainian President Zelensky has successfully won the support of many Western countries, and this moral tie makes it unlikely that the core Western countries will directly cut off aid to Ukraine.
b) In particular, according to current data, the United States and the United Kingdom provide about 2/3 of military aid to Ukraine, of which the United States provides half ($7.75 billion), followed by the United Kingdom ($2.7 billion). Therefore, even if France and Germany (whose support for Ukraine is definitely "have to", or "half-hearted") drastically reduce or even stop military aid to Ukraine, Ukraine should be able to continue to persist, but There will certainly be major implications for Ukraine's counter-offensive plans.
2. Air superiority. At the beginning of the war, most analysts believed that Russia should be able to quickly gain complete or at least absolute air and space superiority, but Russia did not. Although Russia may still have a chance, the probability of Russia achieving complete or at least absolute air and space superiority seems unlikely.
3. Russia's economic dilemma. Contrary to many analysts, I never thought Russia was heading for economic collapse quickly. In my opinion, in the face of comprehensive economic sanctions from the West, it will take at least 6-12 months after the Western sanctions go into effect for Russia's economic woes to really start to manifest. Russia had anticipated certain economic sanctions pressures from the United States and the West before the war, and made considerable preparations. In addition, many non-Western countries did not impose sanctions on Russia. Therefore, Russia's economy still has some room for maneuver and tenacity. However, after the comprehensive economic sanctions last from 6 to 12 months, the Russian economy will face more and more difficulties, and the impact of such difficulties on the Russian people will gradually be reflected.
4. Public opinion and determination on both sides of the war. At present, it seems that both Russia and Ukraine have no intention to negotiate a truce, and both sides are continuing to work hard to gain local advantages on the battlefield. However, with the continuation of the war, there will be a series of changes in public opinion on both sides, especially if the casualties continue to expand, the lives of the people willBasic guarantees will not be available.
In terms of the above four core factors, only one, or at most one and a half factors, is beneficial to Russia. For Ukraine, the favorable factor is at most only one and a half. Therefore, after integrating political factors, the outcome of the war is still uncertain. However, Russia is certainly under greater pressure: as the offensive side, if it fails to achieve its original strategic goals, it will be considered a failure. And Ukraine, as a defensive side, can at least not be considered a failure as long as it can resist the attack and achieve certain counter-offensive results.
Timeline
I think that the war will continue at least until August next year, given that neither Russia and Ukraine have any intention of truce negotiations, and both continue to work hard to gain local advantages on the battlefield. That is, the cycle of war may last a year and a half (18 months). Both sides may try to make more progress on the battlefield before winter arrives. After the winter comes, both sides may take a break for a few months due to climatic factors (this of course depends on what this winter in Europe will be like), and in March next year, the two sides will fight again. At that time, the fighting between the two sides on the battlefield should have a relatively clear situation. On the one hand, whether Russia passes the winter and forces certain countries in Western Europe to stop, or at least drastically reduce aid to Ukraine. On the other hand, whether Ukraine will continue to acquire more heavy weapons and long-range firepower through the winter, thereby further enhancing its combat effectiveness. If the two sides still cannot "show it off" by August next year, there may be a stronger willingness to negotiate. But if the two sides are not willing to negotiate by then, the war could continue for another cycle, that is, another year and a half, until February 2025, after the US election.
And if I have to "bet", I think there is a very high probability that the war will continue after the US election. It will be a long winter. I am definitely opposed to Russia sending troops to Ukraine. Not only is this a moral issue, but I also think Russia is doing "more harm than good". In particular, my judgment is not because I am against maintaining good Sino-Russian relations. In fact, I clearly stated in 1999-2000 that maintaining a good Sino-Russian relationship (with a bottom line, of course) is necessary for China.
I said before that there are four possible outcomes that Russia may face (there are only four, because Russia is unlikely to "quick defeat"), and the possible impact on China is (the reasoning behind this will not be expanded):
1. A victory may be in China's best interest.
2. Slow wins are also ok for China.
3. Slow defeat is the worst for China.
4. A draw is not very favorable for China, but it may be an opportunity for China if we can participate in the post-armistic negotiations and contribute to the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war.
In any case, the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the international landscape will be far-reaching and lasting. China must carefully assess the situation. Looking back 10 years later, 2022 may be considered a very pivotal year in China's modernization process.
(The author is Fudan University Distinguished Professor and Director of Fudan University Complex Decision Analysis Center.)
Source: Fudan Complex Decision Analysis
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