Author: Forget about Jianghu
In the battlefield to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, 5 division-level cadres were dismissed from their positions in the front line.
Who are these five division-level cadres? They were all fired for what reason? Will the dismissal on the spot on the 38th line of and have any effect on the award in 1955? What is the fate of these five division-level cadres who were dismissed on the spot by the battlefield?
has clear rewards and punishments on the battlefield, which is one of the invincible magic weapons of our army. But there has never been a victorious general on the battlefield. Victory or defeat is a common thing in military affairs. As a division-level cadre, being dismissed in the line of fire is a profound life lesson.
These 5 division-level cadres who were dismissed on the spot include 2 division commanders, 2 political commissars and 1 acting division commander.
crossed the Yalu River
1. Division political commissar who used the wrong final decision power
The first division-level cadre to be dismissed by the Fire Line was Ji Tiezhong, political commissar of the 124th Division of the 42nd Army.
Ji Tiezhong is from Binxian County, Jilin Province, and joined Zhao Shangzhi's Harmony Detachment in 1934. After the "July 7th Incident", he went to the third division of Shiyou in southern Hebei to do united front work, and was then incorporated into the eastward column of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and later served as the director of the Political Department of the 4th Military Division in southern Hebei. During the liberation, he served as director of the Political Department of Songjiang Military Region. The 124th Division of the
42 Army was the first unit to cross the Yalu River. In the first battle, it became known as Huangcaoling.
After the second battle was launched, the 113th Division of the 38th Army and the 124th Division of the 42nd Army successively took on interspersed tasks. The 113th Division of the 38th Army marched 75 kilometers day and night to reach Sansuoli and Longyuanli, but the 124th Division of the 43rd Army did not catch up. To Suncheon and Sukcheon.
In fact, the 124th Division has arrived at Yaboli on the east bank of the Datong River, and there is only 20 kilometers left to cross the river.
Division Commander Su Kezhi believes that it is necessary to cross the river immediately, build a position, and stop the US military. Political commissar Ji Tiezhong believed that the strength of the 124th Division alone was not enough, and insisted on waiting for the 125th Division to arrive and cross the river to block the U.S. military. The division commander and the political commissar were arguing, and finally Ji Tiezhong used the political commissar's final veto power.
In this way, the 124 division wasted more than ten hours of precious time. At about 9 o'clock in the morning the next day, the two divisions crossed the river together, causing congestion at the ferry. As a result, they were bombarded indiscriminately by the US planes, and they finally crossed the Datong River.
Due to the delay of the fighter, a major shortcoming of the second battle, Ji Tiezhong, the political commissar of the 124th Division, was dismissed by the fire line. In 1951, he was transferred to the Northeast Military Region Political and Cultural Cadre School Principal. In 1955, as the political commissar of the Northeast Engineering Corps, he was awarded a major. It can be said that his dismissal did not affect the rating. Afterwards, Ji Tiezhong went to Daqing to participate in the petroleum conference. In his later years, he served as the deputy minister of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry.
2. The division commanders and political commissars who looked ahead and delayed the fighter jets were also the second battle. The 88th Division of the 26th Army on the Changjin Lake battlefield on the east front was not so lucky. This time, Wu Dalin, the commander of the 88th Division of the 26th Army of the Ninth Corps, and Gong Jie, the political commissar, were hesitant and delayed. Wu Dalin is a native of southern Sichuan. He served as the deputy battalion commander of the Red Army and the New Fourth Army during the Anti-Japanese War. During the liberation, he served as the commander of the 88th Division of the Sanye 30th Army. The political commissar of the
88 division is from Pingjiang, Hunan, and has participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising. He is a young talent that the chairman admires very much. Later served as machine gunner, guerrilla vice-captain. During the Anti-Japanese War, Gong Jie's highest position was the Communist Youth League. During the liberation period, Gong Jie served as the deputy political commissar and political commissar of the 88th Division.
In January 1950, the 30th Army was transferred to the Navy, and the 88th, 89th, and 90th divisions were assigned to the 26th, 20th, and 27th corps, respectively.
Before the Battle of Changjin Lake was launched, because even the minimum food and cotton clothes were very tight, Song Shilun did not follow the chairman's suggestion to place the 26th army in front of the reserve, but placed it in Jiangjin, 100 kilometers away from Changjin Lake. Therefore, when the 1st Marine Division broke through, the 20th Army and 27th Army of the Ninth Corps had already lost their combat effectiveness, and they could only let the 26th Army put out the fire to block the road for the US military to retreat south.
26 Commander Zhang Renchu ordered the 88th Division to arrive at the front line of Duxiu Peak south of Xiajiyuli within a time limit. At the critical moment, the 88th Division lost its chain. First, it was afraid of getting lost in the heavy snow at night and delayed the departure time. During the daytime march, it was bombed by American planes and lost its soldiers. It arrived at the designated location 15 hours late.
On the battlefield, they only looked at the results and did not ask about the process. The 26th Army was severely criticized by the Ninth Corps, and Wu Dalin and Gong Jie were dismissed on the spot because of "cowardice". After returning to China, Wu Dalin served as the commander of the Jinzhou Military Division, and Gong Jie served as the second political commissar of the Zhenjiang Military Division. In 1955, both were awarded the rank of colonel.
On September 9, 1976, after the death of the chairman, Gong Jie was named by the organization and rushed to Beijing to give the chairman a wake-up call.
The U.S. Army in Changjin Lake
3. The division commander who did not listen to the advice of the political commissar and was hesitant
The fourth cadre at the division level of the Volunteer Army who was dismissed on the spot is the 189th division commander Xu Cheng.
Xu Cheng is from Ningdu, Jiangxi Province. He was a security guard of President Peng, and later served as the head of the 30th Regiment of the 10th Red Division. During the Anti-Japanese War, he served as the battalion commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army and the political commissar of the Division Supply Office. During the liberation period, he served as the commander of the 193th Division of the 19th Corps of Jinchaji, and participated in the Qingfengdian, Shijiazhuang and Pingjin campaigns.
In the first stage of the fifth battle, the 19th Corps of the Volunteer Army was assigned to the 1st Corps of the People's Army, which was responsible for forcibly crossing the Linjin River. After the battle, the 187th Division of the 63rd Army encircled the Gloucester Battalion of the British 29th Brigade in Xuemali, and the 188th Division broke into a depth of 30 kilometers, cutting off the connection between the British 29th Brigade and the American 3rd Division.
At a critical moment, the 189th Division of the reserve team lost its chain. Cai Changyuan, the political commissar of the 189th Division, suggested to cross the river immediately to cooperate with the 187th and 188th Divisions to encircle the British 29th Brigade to expand the victory. Division Commander Xu Cheng hesitated for a few hours before agreeing, but after Jiang had passed, he stopped advancing on the grounds that he was waiting for an order from the military.
At 9 a.m. the next day, the 189th Division was bombed by the US military. Gao Lianxi, deputy head of the 565th regiment, and Li Kai, the deputy head of the 566th regiment, died. Even worse, the follow-up 64th Army and 65th Army were unable to cross the river and were exposed to the bombardment of American planes all day.
President Peng personally ordered Xu Cheng to be removed from office on the spot, and political commissar Cai Changyuan took over as the teacher. Changing coaches is like changing knives, and the 189th Division performed against the sky in the Cheerwon blocking battle . Xu Cheng was changed to the commander of the 19th Corps' supplementary training division and the director of the artillery command. Compared with Wu Dalin and Gong Jie of the 88th Division of the 26th Army, Xu Cheng's ending should be considered much luckier. Later, Xu Cheng also served as the deputy commander of the 63rd Army and the 67th Army, the political commissar of the Tianjin Garrison Area, and the secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee.
Founder Xu Cheng
Fourth, inexperienced acting division commander
The fifth volunteer division-level cadre who was dismissed by the FireWire is Zheng Qigui, the acting divisional division commander of the 180th Division.
Zheng Qigui is from Jinzhai, Anhui Province. He joined the 4th Red Army at the age of 16, from a soldier, squad leader, company commander, to the division management section chief. During the Anti-Japanese War, he served as the head of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. During the liberation period, he served as deputy brigade commander, deputy commander and chief of staff of the 180th Division of the Shanxi-Hebei-Luyu Military Region. When
entered the DPRK to fight, Deng Shijun, the commander of the 180th Division, had been promoted to the chief of staff of the 60th Army, and Zheng Qigui took over as the division commander.
In the third stage of the fifth campaign, the Volunteers changed from attack to defense. Van Vleet accurately grasped the characteristics of the "Worship Offensive" of the Volunteers, and adopted a new tactic that combined the special forces interspersed raids with the mechanized troop siege and interception, killing the volunteers with a carbine.
To be honest, the fact that the 180th Division was besieged was an objective factor, but Zheng Qigui's lack of experience in the war was also an important factor. From hesitating at the beginning to breaking out later, it showed the responsibility and courage of the leader of a division, but from a tactical point of view, there is undoubtedly a problem.
In the end, the 180th Division sacrificed more than 3,000 people, captured more than 3,000 people, and returned to rebuild more than 4,000 people.
Zheng Qigui
Although the entire army was not wiped out, and there was no loss of formation, the 180th Division was hit hard, and the negative impact was great. Zheng Qigui was removed from his post on the spot, received a review, and later became the director of the Corps Management Division at the regiment level. After returning to China, he served as the deputy chief of staff of the Jilin Provincial Military Region at the deputy division level.
was awarded the title in 1955, and Zheng Qigui was awarded the rank of colonel. In 1963, he was promoted to the rank of colonel.
On January 26, 1990, Zheng Qigui, who was dying, faced his old superior and his brother-in-law Deng Shijun.Take one step, and you will see the comrades who died in the 180th Division immediately. The fiasco of the 38th line that year, accompanied Zheng Qigui to the end of his life.
In his later years, Zheng Qigui and his relatives were in the Anhui cadre rest center
[deeply cultivated in the history of war, promote positive energy, welcome to contribute, private letter will reply]
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